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JOHN DEWEY'S IDEAS ABOUT THE GREAT DEPRESSION
BY EDWARD J. BORDEAU

Some criticisms that have been directed against John Dewey's political theory reveal a general misunderstandingof his intent. Such notables
as Richard Hofstadter, Morton White, and Reinhold Niebuhr have at
various times penned objections to what they have labeled Dewey's
"methodolatry" and his "intellectualism." Even within the pragmatic
fold, we find Morton White's charge of "formalism" accepted; in his
most recent work, H. S. Thayer has penned: "Dewey is able to suggest how problems are to be encountered and resolved but not what the
solutions are or should be. The temptation has been to search Dewey's
writings for an answer to moral difficulties or intellectual doubts."'
Certainly Dewey does not offer us final or settled solutions but this is
not the issue; at various times in his long career, he thought seriously
and deeply about many social and moral problems, and it is our contention that he provided his liberal followers with some answers to some of
these problems. His social and political activities were a lived extension
of his political theorizing. From the First World War to the end of the
Depression and after-as long as he was actively involved in social and
political movements-he applied his theory to practice in concrete engagements. Dewey's appeal for the use of intelligence in social change
can easily lend itself to caricature as long as intelligence retains its scholastic connotation. Intelligence-in-action can best be exemplified in
Dewey's own active political and social work. His theory and practice
are of one piece, and the criticisms, especially of Morton White and
Reinhold Niebuhr, would readily vanish in the light of the political
activities Dewey undertook just before and throughout the Depression.
Where Dewey seems obscure in theory we should allow his practice to
illuminate his meaning. I feel it would be of great value in clarifying
Dewey's whole approach to social and political theory to examine in
some detail how he applied his own convictions to action.
John Dewey was quite active in writing, lecturing, and propagandizing during the Depression years. Our primary concern in this
article is the role he played in the efforts of the League for Independent
Political Action to sponsor a third party from 1928 until the collapse of
this project in 1936. Concurrent with this movement is Dewey's work
with the People's Lobby in advocating social welfare programs to meet
the crises generated by the Depression.
'H. S. Thayer, Meaning and Action, A Critical History of Pragmatism
(New York, 1968), 182.
67

This content downloaded from 74.217.196.17 on Mon, 30 Jun 2014 16:56:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

68

EDWARD

J. BORDEAU

Yet it is significant that both the LIPA and the PL were formed
prior to the great market crash of October 1929. Dewey, together with
many liberal-minded intellectuals, was never blind to the inherent
weaknesses of American capitalism-even in the great "era of prosperity," from 1922 to 1929. Most intellectuals knew that periodic depressions were inevitable under the system of finance-capitalism2
Even though reform agitation of the progressive genre faded into relative insignificance in the post war years, liberals like George Norris
and Robert La Follette continued to sponsor welfare programs. Yet
the social programs Dewey had advocated in 1908 and 1918 were far
removed from serious consideration in an era given over entirely to
Herbert Hoover's "rugged individualism."
In 1922, the Conference for Progressive Political Action (CPPA)
was formed, offering as a third-party candidate for the 1924 presidential election Robert La Follette, Sr. His platform pleased Dewey as it
combined his reformism with isolation and the outlawry of war. Dewey's voting record indicates rwhathe himself confessed, that he was an
independent; yet most of nis votes were cast for third-party candidates
and liberals. Believing there "are no absolutes in politics," Dewey
confessed that he voted for Grover Cleveland in 1884. Then in 1912 he
voted for Eugene Debs, the socialist who was incarcerated during the
War for dissent. In 1916, he voted for Woodrow Wilson and for Charles
E. Hughes as governor of New York State.3 In 1923, he worked and
voted for La Follette.4 Just to complete the known record, in 1928,
Dewey met and backed Alfred A. Smith; 1932 and 1936 went to Norman Thomas for president (in 1938, Dewey voted for Thomas as
governor of New York State).5 The only other indication of his later
voting record reveals that he voted for Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1944.6
The purpose of a recitation of these facts is to illustrate that for a long
time Dewey realized the importance of third-party agitation in terms
of offering the public real alternatives. What he especially wanted was
a party to embrace and propose progressive programs, for progressivism sprang from the practical idealism of the American spirit.
2John Dewey, "Prospects for a Third Party," New Republic, 71 (July 27, 1932),
278.
3Dewey, "Wallace vs a New Party," New Leader, 31 (Oct. 30, 1948), 14;
"The Hughes Campaign," New Republic, 8 (Oct. 28, 1916), 320.
4Dewey, New Leader, 31 (Oct. 30, 1948), 14; "Dewey aids La Follette,"
N. Y. Times (Oct. 23, 1924).
5Dewey, "Why I am for Smith," New Republic, 56 (Nov. 7, 1928), 320;
"Education, Democracy, and Socialized Economy," Social Frontier, 5 (Dec., 1938),72.
6"John Dewey, at 85, Defends Doctrines," N. Y. Times (Oct. 20, 1944), 32.
"He distrusts the 'isolationism' of the Republican Party and intends to vote for
President Roosevelt as the man most likely to 'lead us forward.' "
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Robert La Follette, running on the progressive platform, made a
good showing in 1924; he gained 5,000,000 votes, one sixth of the total
votes cast.7 But in the following years, protest politics declined and the
CPPA disintegrated. By the time of the 1928 presidential election
Americans had little to choose from in the contest between Alfred A.
Smith and Herbert Hoover. John Dewey made the acquaintance of
Smith that year and decided to back him.8 He later acknowledged that
the intrinsic ties to the financial world on the part of both parties reduced their difference to insignificance, for both served the interests of
big business.9
Dewey consistently allied himself with every effort to educate the
public about the economic and political realities of the times-even
prior to the market crash of 1929-for only as so equipped could collective public intelligence become an operational force in self-determination. Such groups as the LIPA and the PL were not political parties
but educational organizations attempting to give direction to inchoate
sentiments aroused in times of crisis.
Dewey was not one of the original group of political dissidents who,
after the election of Hoover in 1928, sought to organize a new party
along progressive lines.10 Yet the inspiration and philosophy behind
the organization was provided by Dewey's The Public and Its Problems
(1927)." After the election, in December, the Nation pointed out the
bankruptcy of both parties calling for a new political effort. Neither of
the major parties was prepared to address itself to the problems of
economic reorganization, and the major role of the new party would be
to sponsor long-term industrial and economic reform. Paul H. Douglas,
an economist from the University of Chicago, organized the LIPA in
the summer of 1929 as the educational and directive nucleus of a radical new party.
Dewey observed that the progressive sentiment-so much a part
of American political life-was neither dead nor sleeping, but diffused. As unorganized it was impotent; the LIPA offered itself as the
7Donald R. McCoy, Angry Voices, Left-of-center Politics in the New Deal Era
(Lawrence, Kansas, 1958), 320.
8Dewey, New Republic, 56 (Nov. 7, 1928), 320.
9Dewey, "The Need for a New Party, I: The Present Crisis," New Republic,
66 (March 18, 1931), 115. "For the old parties are so firmly entrenched throughout
the nation, and the organizations are so closely bound to the business system that
unorganizedindividualsfeel themselves helpless."
'ODewey,New Republic, 71 (July 27, 1932), 278.
"Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt, The Crisis of the Old
Order (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), 142. "Paul Douglas organized the League for
Independent Political Action in 1929 as a means for fulfilling Dewey's The Public
and Its Problems."
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clearing house for independent radical groups in the work to create
an effective third party. What liberals needed, he urged, was a set of
principles, primarily economic, around which to rally.12Dewey served
as the LIPA's chairman and its national committee boasted the membership of such renowns as Stuart Chase, Oswald Garrison Villard,
Harry Laidler, and Reinhold Niebuhr.13
Throughout 1930, the LIPA undertook a massive educational and
organizational campaign. Dewey, lending the support of his great
name, signed form letters appealing for membership, and during the
first nine months of its existence the LIPA gained 2,500 members. In
the 1930 elections, the LIPA supported and successfully ran several independents for office. The League was encouraged by the election of
Farm-Laborites in Minnesota, as governor and United States Senator.14 With these successes behind it, the LIPA sought to persuade
the progressive block in Congress to openly support a new third party
organized along a progressive economic program.
Dewey, as national chairman of the LIPA, wrote an open letter to
Senator George Norris on December 25, 1930, urging him to "renounce both of these old parties and to help give birth to a new party
based upon the principles of planning and control for the purpose of
building happier lives, a more just society and that peaceful world
which was the dream of Him whose birthday we celebrate this Christmas Day?"15Dewey estimated that Norris might be more vulnerable
to such a suggestion at this time, for in the November election, the
executive director of the Republican National Committee, Robert H.
Lucas, had stated that "Senator Norris did not belong to the Republican party as the latter was 'too socially minded'."16 Lucas had actually spent money and issued literature in an attempt to prevent Norris
from winning the senatorial race in Nebraska.
Dewey wrote that he had been informed by senators and representatives of both parties that "the formation of a third party" is inevitable and "predicted that it could win the Presidency by 1940."17
Dewey advised Norris that the Republican party was committed to
laissez-faire and "rugged individualism," whereas "you stand for social planning and social control." "New wine can't be put in old bottles," so Norris should defect and join a new party, for "the new political philosophy needs it own incarnation."18
Norris, however, declined; he planned to remain at least a nominal
Republican, despite the fact that he had openly supported Smith over
'2Dewey, "What Do Liberals Want?" Outlook and Independent, 153 (Oct. 16, 1929),
261.
'3Schlesinger, 198.
'5N. Y. Times (Dec. 26, 1930).
"McCoy, 8.
6lbid.
181bid.
'7Ibid.
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Hoover who, he believed, had turned the country over to "power
trust."19 He preferred to put his trust in independent voting rather
than to form a new party.
John Dewey responded; in an address delivered on December 30,
1930, before the New History Society at the Community Church located on Park Avenue at Thirty-fourth Street (2,000 were in attendance), he denounced Republican insurgents, like Norris and Borah,
who were waiting for "a tide on which they can ride without having to
take risks. It is too bad they lack courage." They fail to see how ripe
the time is for a third party, for "just as the Republican Party was
born in the irrepressible conflict against the extension of chattel slavery,
so the new party will be born to liberate us from the enslavement of
governmental agencies to selfish and predatory interest."20
This exchange, although it brought the LIPA third-party agitation into the public eye, tended to alienate congressional progressives
who, consequently, declined to invite the LIPA membership to participate in the 1931 Conference of Progressives. Nonetheless, the
publicity paid off; early in 1931 The New Republic announced enthusiastic support for LIPA aims. Dewey was asked to write a series of
articles explaining its programs. They appeared in March and April in
four consecutive articles.
Both major parties, Dewey declared,-the parties of Jefferson and
Lincoln-are philosophically anachronistic but even more are irretrievably tied to the interests of business and finance. It would be close
to magic, he suggested, to expect "that those with privilege will voluntarily remedy the breakdown they have created."21The government
is not in the hands of the people but in the hands of the captains of industry. They control the government as well as utilities and the press
but while they rule, they do not govern. The words above reveal that
Dewey never dogmatized his belief in voluntary, social cooperation;
the implicit suggestion is that irresponsible business must, if needs be,
be forced to give up its privileges.
Since both parties subserve the interests of finance-capital, a new
radical party concerned with returning control of the government to
the people is desperately needed. The American middle class, the traditional seat of progressive sentiment and idealism, is waiting for direction. Neither the Socialists, the Communists, nor the older parties
'9"Norris Declines to Head New Party: Still a Republican," N. Y. Times
(Dec. 27, 1930).
20"Dewey on Norris' Rejection to Form a Third Party," N. Y. Times
(Dec. 31, 1930), 3.
2Dewey, "The Necd for a New Party, II: The Breakdown of the Old Order,"
New Republic, 66 (March 25, 1931), 150.
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are congenial to this progressivism; nor are they interested in changing
the present order, at least in the characteristically American way.
Policies of the last fifty years reveal that politics has been concerned with production, not consumption. Piecemeal reform will get
us nowhere; we need, he urged, to perform an about-face and to reorganize along totally different lines.22 In articulating the policies for the
new party, he recommended a planned economy with the possible
socialization of utilities, power, banking, and credit. By this he meant
governmental control and perhaps even ownership if it seemed necessary. He also advised the government regulation of the radio and press,
and advocated the taxation of land value.23
Throughout 1931, Dewey continually attacked the inactivity of the
Hoover administration through the People's Lobby Bulletin. In May,
he demonstrated the gross inequities of the present economic order by
showing that eighty percent of the nation's wealth belonged to four
percent of the population. As a solution he urged a sharp increase in the
taxation of the higher brackets to pay for relief programs. He counseled Hoover to call a special session of Congress to handle the growing social and economic problems of the Depression. When Hoover,
unconvinced of the seriousness of the depression, rejected the proposal
to call such a session to deal with unemployment, saying we can't legislate ourselves out of trouble, Dewey hastened to point out the relief
potential of unemployment insurance and public works. Is it, Dewey
asked, that Hoover is afraid to tax the rich friends who gave funds to
his campaign? 24
At this time, Dewey also had critical words for the Congressional
Progressives who had held their Conference of Progressives in Washington in March (and who had not invited the LIPA). They had failed
to exert sufficient force on the administration in demanding a special
session of Congress on unemployment. He reminded Robert La Follette of his 1924 progressive pledge and urged him to fight for them
now.
Dewey, however, was more incensed with Hoover's seeming indifference and insensitivity to the deprivation and suffering all across
the country. With ten million Americans unemployed, Hoover's dismissal of the depression as transitory was the height of blind devotion
to the system of special privilege and contempt for labor. Hoover's
22"Who Might Make a New Party?" Ibid. (April 1, 1931), 177. "On the one
hand, it implies the possibility and the desirability of boring from within by methods
which will eventually produce a complete face-about and reorganization."
23"Policiesfor a New Party," Ibid. (April 8, 1931), 204.
24"Full Warehouses and Empty Stomachs," People's Lobby Bulletin (May,
1931),I,i,

1.
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strategy of aiding capital to stimulate production was destined to fail
as the real solution must focus on consumption.
Throughout 1931, Dewey continued to propagandize for his socialism by letter, articles, and radio broadcasts; this he did as the official
spokesman for the LIPA and as president of the People's Lobby. By
1932, the LIPA was well organized; the LIPA attempted to get the
Socialist Party and the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party to merge with
the LIPA; although both refused, they did give their support.25
As the LIPA looked to the 1932 elections, it faced many obstacles
to a concerted effort. In addition to the Socialist Party which wanted to
go it alone there was the national Farm-Labor Party, the Jobless Party
founded by Father James R. Cox, and the Liberty Party. With such
divisiveness on the one hand and the strong appeal to liberals and progressives of the democratic governor of New York State, Franklin D.
Roosevelt on the other, prospects for third-party activities appeared
dismal. At first LIPA officials attacked Roosevelt but later changed
their tactics, claiming that Roosevelt's liberalism could never be effective from within the democratic machine, for it was so intrinsically
tied to the business world. Instead of reforming his party, the party
would reform him.
Early in 1932, the Socialists and the LIPA began to work more
closely together, even if separately. In February, Norman Thomas
and other LIPA officials advocated a third party similar to the
British Labor Party; however, they admitted that its efficacy as a real
force in American politics might require several years to mature.26
The following month, Dewey warned that if the major parties failed to
nominate a progressive candidate for president, a third party would
certainly be initiated. Norman Thomas balked at this prediction, for
he would withhold support for such a party. It would be a wasted effort
like the La Follette coalition of 1924. Obviously, Thomas was planning
to run himself as a third-party presidential candidate.
As a result, the LIPA looked to the Minnesota Farmer-Labor
Party for 1932 but by spring that organization had reached an informal
agreement with the Roosevelt camp. Consequently, unable to enlist
support for a candidate to run against the two major parties from
either the Socialists, Farmer-Laborites, as well as Congressional progressives, the LIPA by May had jettisoned the third-party idea for
1932. At the LIPA convention that year, held in Cleveland, the execu25The Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party played an important role in Minnesota
politics throughout the Depression and after; this group finally merged with the
Democratic Party in 1944. Hubert H. Humphrey was instrumental in bringing about
this merger; the new organization which sponsored him as a mayoral candidate in
Minneapolis with success in 1945 was called the Democratic Farmer-Labor Party
(DFL).
26Dewey,New Republic, 71 (July 27, 1932), 278.
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tive committee decided to endorse Norman Thomas for president.
The LIPA developed, however, the most comprehensive platform
offered by any political group-a platform "reminiscent of the Populist,
Bull Moose, and 1924 Progressive platform."27 It was bolder and went
further than the New Deal; called the Four-Year Presidential Plan, it
asked for three to five million dollars for public works and $250,000,000
for direct relief annually. The plan called for an increase in taxation on higher-bracket incomes, and recommended larger corporation
and inheritance taxes; in addition, the plan advocated the establishment of worker's insurance, old age pension, the abolition of child
labor, and a six-hour work day. The program supported public ownership of power, utilities, coal, oil, the railroad, and advocated a reduction of the tariff rates and aid to farmers. On the international scene,
the LIPA platform urged United States participation in the League of
Nations, the World Court, and recognition of Russia.
As the national chairman of the LIPA, it would not be presumptuous to suggest that Dewey had some influence in the formation of this
platform. Certainly he gave his adherence to its policies for he continued to advocate them throughout the Depression. The only qualification he was likely to make would probably have pertained to American participation in the League and World Court. We have never
discovered any retraction of his earlier rejection of the League and
World Court; on the contrary statements have been found that demonstrate that as late as 1945 he still refused to accept any international
organization formed solely for political as opposed to economic purposes.28 The LIPA platform offered the American public "a more
practical and practicable form of idealism" than any other political
organization of the day and was by and large the most comprehensive.2 Although the LIPA decided to back the Socialist Party, they
voted 47 to 8 not to support any communist candidates, for their aims
and methods were not congenial to the American progressive tradition; the LIPA fancied itself the organ of that practical idealism, attempting to give it expression and direction.
Dewey predicted, as the elections drew near, that many votes for
Roosevelt would in reality be votes against Hoover.30 Many independents hesitated to vote outside the Democratic Party lest they
thereby aid the cause of Hoover. As a result, Roosevelt won by a landslide, with Norman Thomas polling only 884,781 votes-two percent
of the total votes cast. However, Dewey was not disspirited by the out27McCoy,18.
28John Dewey, "Democratic versus Coercive International Organization: The
Realism of Jane Addams," in Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War,
1915-1945 (New York, 1945), xv.
29McCoy,20.
30Dewey,New Republic, 71 (July 27, 1932), 279.
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come, for he interpreted the elections as "a vote for new realignment
in political measures if not for it in political parties." He contended
that the Western agrarians had rejected the Republican Party for its
failure to solve the nation's economic problems and that they stood
ready to repudiate the Democratic Party too if it also failed. Dewey
was confident that it would: "It will fail. Somebody must see to it
that four years from now they do not simply swing back into the Republican Party which will be the promising party."31 The campaign
had been, at least, educative and some gains were made in the election
of four new Farmer-Labor Party congressmen. Slowly the LIPA was
gaining political experience and they began to look in different directions for new support and strength. More and more they turned to
labor and agriculture and less to intellectuals and socialists.
One obvious reason for turning away from the socialists was the
extremely poor showing they made at the polls. Attempts were made
to analyze their unexpected failure. Gabriel Heatter, in an "Open Letter to Norman Thomas," blasted those dogmatic socialists who were
unwilling to change the name of the party-a name erroneously, of
course, associated with "a breakdown of the American home." He
blamed their failure on their unwillingness to join in a third-party
movement more congenial to Americans, a movement supporting a
platform hardly distinguishable from that of the Socialists: "Surely
the amazingly small vote you received in this unparalleled economic
emergency is the final answer to those who insist that they will not
change the name, the appeal, the control, or remove a dot or dash
from the platform."32
Norman Thomas replied. The need for a new name and less dogmatism, he wrote, was a common criticism, but not the real cause for
the defeat of the Socialist Party. He blamed those progressives who
made their votes a negative one by voting for Roosevelt as a protest
against Hoover and he accused them of a lack of vision and dedication.
Although he appreciated LIPA support, he claimed it did not help
much and contributed little to his campaign. Socialism alone, he asserted, has the vision and a philosophy powerful enough, once understood by the people, to mobilize them. The name stays, he wrote, and
urged leftists to join him. Then he attacked the LIPA for being ideologically weak and impotent; it lacked a decided program and philosophy of political action, disdaining as it does contact with the working
masses.33
3"News Bulletin of the League for Independent Political Action" (Nov.-Dec.,
1932), 1.
32Gabriel Heatter, "The Future of the Socialist Party: Open Letter to Norman
Thomas," Nation, 135 (Dec. 14, 1932), 584.
33NormanThomas, "Norman Thomas Replies," Ibid., 585.
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The national chairman of the League for Independent Political
Action could not let this criticism pass. Dewey admitted the need for a
new, strong political philosophy, but he seriously doubted that the
Socialist Party "alone" could supply it. To attack the LIPA as weak
in commitment showed, he thought, some grave misunderstanding of
its aims and philosophy. First, he pointed out, the LIPA is not a political party but an organization seeking to unite dissident groups so as to
present a united front in the formation of a third party. The LIPA's
philosophy is not a watered down socialism as Thomas had charged,
but an expression of the American democratic faith, believing that
the direction of political action must be dictated by the social conditions and needs of the time. As such, its program is tentative and experimental, but nonetheless definite; it too espouses the socialization
of production and distribution, since this is clearly a need of the times.
To achieve such goals, however, the LIPA knows very well that it
needs power which can be had only through concerted dissident political action.34 Instead of attacking various liberal groups, like the
LIPA and the middle class in general, Thomas and the Socialist Party
ought to work for unity; Dewey urged Thomas to join with the LIPA
and other progressive and radical groups in 1933. These same criticisms that Dewey directed at the Socialists, he repeated against proponents of Marxism. In response to Reinhold Niebuhr, Dewey rejected
such dogmatic schemes as foreign to the experimental temper, for
constructive reorganization must be partial and tentative; definiteness
and decisiveness are not alien to such a method, for it can as easily support deep commitment and radical political action as can the Marxist
ideology.35
By March 1933, when Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed leadership of
his depressed country, economic collapse had reached high tide. The
Hoover administration, turning a deaf ear to pleas for direct relief for
the mass of unemployed, had sought rather to revive the economy by
granting financial aid to business. Dewey, as President of the People's
Lobby, had from the beginning held that the key to recovery lay in the
purchasing power of the people and for that reason had supported unemployment insurance and public works.36 It became immediately
apparent that only a change of leadership in Washington-to one
sympathetic to these needs-could force these programs into legislation, since it was only too obvious that financial and industrial leaders
would not willingly surrender their privileges; they would have to be
restrained by the government and the first step in that direction was to
34Dewey, "The Future of Radical Political Action," Nation, 136 (Jan. 4, 1933), 8.
35"Unityand Progress," World Tomorrow, 16 (March, 1933), 232.
36"Prosperity Depends on Building From Bottom Up," People's Lobby Bulletin
(April, 1932), I, xii, 1.
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force them to pay higher taxes:
Our entire history and experienceproves that the financial and industrial
leaders of the nationwill not make these changesvoluntarily-they will not,
except under compulsion,surrendertheir most profitableshare of a system
which has concentratedfour-fifthsof the nation's wealth in the hands of
onetwenty-fifthsof the people.
The Federal Government alone has the power to force the wealthy owners
nation to surrender their control over the lives and destinies of the
the
of
overwhelming majority of the American people and the first step is to compel them to pay taxes commensurate in sacrifice, with that of people with
very small incomes.37(Dewey's emphasis)

Since the Democratic Party was anchored to financial interests as
much as the Republican Party, Roosevelt's New Deal would have to be
compromised. Despite the improvements that were beginning to be felt
in May, two months after his inauguration, the LIPA officials still remained skeptical, but the rank and file members marveled at the emergency measures Roosevelt managed to push through the special session
of Congress he had immediately called. Dewey, writing in Common
Sense, which had become "the official organ of the League," warned
that Rooseveltian measures "are both somewhat blind and halfhearted,
and their chief desire is to bolster and repair the present systemwhich means as sure as night follows day an ultimate return of complete power and rule to the very elements that have brought the nation
to its present pass."38 League officials were not appeased by Roosevelt's efforts, although they did recognize and applaud his successes.
They were convinced he had compromised too easily with the older order. Hence, they thought the need for a new radical third party was
imperative. The LIPA called a Continental Congress for May, 1933,
to start the machinery rolling for the formation of such a party. Dewey
made pleas for unity among radicals in this movement; in referring
to the deprivation and growing unemployment, he wrote: "The League
for Independent Political Action proposes to do something about it.
In May the League will assemble a national congress in Washington,
D.C. to organize a united New Party. Earnestly, I invite you to join
39
us."39
US.

To the dissatisfaction of the LIPA, the conference, although well
attended-by such varying groups as the Farm Holiday Association,
the Conference for Progressive Labor Action, the needle trade unions,
and the Non-Partisan League-tended to be dominated by the Socialists and nothing much was accomplished. However, as the summer
37"YouMust Act to Get Congress to Act," Ibid. (May, 1932), II, i, 1.
38"ImperativeNeed: A New Radical Party," Common Sense, II (Sept., 1933), 6-7.
39"TheDrive Against Hunger," New Republic, 74 (March 29, 1933), 190.
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rolled around, economic conditions worsened; farmers in their discontent with administration relief measures, struck with some ensuing
violence. Such discontent encouraged LIPA leaders to make another
attempt to organize dissident groups. Disappointed with the Continental Congress of May, the League decided to go it alone and called
for a September conference, inviting labor and farm leaders to attend;
the ultimate aim was to establish a party advocating a "Cooperative
Commonwealth." Instead of compromising with capitalism as Roosevelt had done-by building a state capitalism-the LIPA demanded
radical change and the substitution of industry based on profit for one
truly consonant with the scientific and technological age. But again the
conference did not form a third party; it created a subsidiary organization to increase and unite farm and labor support. Dewey explained
this action to LIPA members in a newsletter:
An important step toward founding a new American party of opposition

was taken at the Conferencefor ProgressivePoliticalAction held at Chicago
September2, and 3. This Conferencewas called by the L.I.P.A. and more
than two hundreddelegates representingleading farm, labor, unemployed
and professionalorganizationswere in attendance.The Conferenceestablished the Farmer Labor Political Federation (you will find a detailed
descriptionof the F.L.P.F. on page 4 of this letter) which was empowered
throughits National Committeeof Action to immediatelybuild a membership organizationcomposed of both affiliatedorganizationsand individual
members.As soon as sufficientmembershipshas been built up throughout
the United States the National Committee of Action is instructedto call
a nationalconventionfor the formallaunchingof the newparty.40
The philosopher was named the honorary chairman of the United
Action Campaign Committee which, as Dewey explained, was to work
to unite farm and labor support for the Farmer Labor Political Federation; this organization would then form a new third party. "We
must," Dewey wrote, "get down into the dirt and dust of the arena and
fight for human rights in a practical, aggressive, realistic manner."41
The LIPA and the FLPF did not merge because of their separate appeals, the former to the educated middle class Americans (intellectuals
and socialists), the latter to discontented farmers and laborers.
At this juncture of events, many older LIPA followers had switched
over to Roosevelt and some to the Socialist Party. The former had
aligned themselves with Roosevelt because, Dewey observed, "they
regard the President as a Moses who is leading us out of the desolation
of the depression." Dewey genuinely applauded what he had accomplished, but the New Deal was merely an attempt to save capitalism
40"Newsletter," United Actior Campaign Committee, undated except for the
4lIbid.
Yale University Libraryseal dated Nov. 27, 1933.

This content downloaded from 74.217.196.17 on Mon, 30 Jun 2014 16:56:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

DEWEY'S

IDEAS ABOUT TIE

DEPRESSION

79

and "only a new system which destroys the profit system can banish
poverty and bring to the American people the economic liberation
which modern science and technology is prepared to bestow upon
them." For Dewey, Roosevelt could succeed only if he abandoned the
Democratic Party; in this eventuality "it is urgent that we propagate
our program and organize so that Roosevelt may be supported when
he is on the right side," but if he should fail, we must be prepared to
offer "an alternative to fascism."42
Throughout 1933-34, Dewey continued to call for more radical
political action than the New Deal offered. When the farm strikes
occurred in the fall of 1933, as president of the People's Lobby, he
wrote an open letter to President Roosevelt noting that "a reduction
in mortgage debts and interest rates somewhat proportional to the
reduction in prices of farm land seems imperatively needed."43Indeed
the Agriculture Adjustment Act, signed by Roosevelt in May to avert
a strike offered some relief but not enough. After the October violence Roosevelt sent Henry Wallace, then Secretary of Agriculture,
and Hugh Johnson, National Recovery Administrator, to the Midwest
to mollify the farmers. By December, through increased loans and
cash benefits, the farm strike was quelled. But discontent did work to
increase third-party possibilities in the Midwest. For Dewey, Roosevelt's action consisted in merely treating symptoms, not causes. He
advised that the sales tax, enacted under Hoover, be repealed; farm
processing taxes and other consumer taxes put the burden where it
hurt the most, on the depressed consumer. Dewey urged a revision of
the Revenue Act to tax harder the higher income brackets.44As far as
he could see, Dewey thought Roosevelt was continuing Hoover's policy
of aiding finance and business with little regard for the masses. The
simplest way to remedy the situation, he proposed, was through higher
taxes on higher incomes to support social relief programs.45
The president of the People's Lobby criticized the manner in
which the Roosevelt administration sought to raise revenues for the
public works and unemployment relief that had been enacted. Next
year's budget, Dewey suggested, would have to come close to ten
billion-where will the money come from? The government will sell
bonds at 4% interest, over a twenty-five year period. If some financiers,
he argued, can afford to buy bonds, they can be taxed more heavily.
The government's method enables the wealthy to increase their wealth
42Ibid.
43"Lobby Asks Special Session on Debts," People's Lobby Bulletin (Oct., 1933),
III, vi, 1.
44"Farm Processing and Other Consumption Taxes Must be Repealed," Ibid.,
(Nov., 1933), III, vii, 1.
45"President'sPolicies Help Property Owners Chiefly," Ibid. (Jan., 1934), III, ix, 1.

This content downloaded from 74.217.196.17 on Mon, 30 Jun 2014 16:56:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

80

EDWARD

J. BORDEAU

at the expense of the poor.46 Dewey noted that the role of the government today has changed drastically from previous periods; no longer
is its function merely that of a policeman. Now it must play the role of
provider.47 To insure this role, the people through their government
must take over the basic agencies on which industry and commerce
depend. He recommended the socialization of banks, railroads, power
companies, mines, and oil. Certainly, the Roosevelt administration,
much more so than that of Hoover, has taken steps in that direction;
but there can be no compromises with the old system. We cannot trust
to halfway measures, but need a radical reorientation, a facing in
another direction. Evidence demonstrated that the New Deal was trying to save the profit system.48During subsequent months, as president
of the People's Lobby, Dewey recommended complete socialization of
all natural resources and basic industries, meaning thereby public ownership through government ownership. This was a more radical program than the one he had offered in 1919, although even then he gave
approval to state capitalism as a transitional stage; there is no reason
to consider his position in 1934 as in any way contradictory to his
earlier position, for, as he made clear to Thomas and Niebuhr, solutions grow out of the present conditions and are not generated a priori
from some metaphysical scheme. To achieve the socialization he
urged, he recommended taxation-extremely heavy on the top-which
would allow the redistribution of wealth. Such taxation would provide
the money to subsidize welfare programs and to compensate the present owners of the basic industries when they are socialized.49
Thus from March 1934, as president of the People's Lobby, John
Dewey became more forceful in rejecting halfway measures. By the fall
of the same year he was certain "the Roosevelt experiment was a failure." Discontent everywhere pointed to a second American revolution,
probably not to the liking of Marxists, but allowing nonetheless "no
truckling to capitalism." Continued strikes, farm revolts, and silent suffering were turning Americans to the left but not to "European models."
Rather, they are seeking an "American radicalism," consistent with
American traditions, signs of which are indicated by "the growth of the
Farmer-Labor or 'third party' movement in the Middle West."50
The FLPF had successfully capitalized on this growing disillusionReal Test of the Administration," Ibid. (Feb., 1934), III, x, 1.
47Ibid."The Federal Government has been obliged to abandon its role of interstate
policeman" and "has now admitted its responsibility to provide work or maintenance
for every American citizen who cannot obtain work."
48"NoHalf Way House For America," Ibid. (Nov., 1934), IV, vii, 1.
49"Socializationof Ground Rent," Ibid. (Jan., 1935), IV, ix, 1.
50"Introduction," Challenge to the New Deal, ed. Alfred Bingham and Selden
Rodman (New York, 1934), 1.
46"A
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ment, and had been especially heartened by the formation of the Wisconsin Progressive Party, the formation of which was a direct result
of the efforts of Thomas Amlie, the FLPF leader in that state. He had
persuaded Robert La Follette to lead the Republican Progressives into
the FLPF third-party movement. The party, formed at a May Convention (1934) at Fond du Lac, Wisconsin, was so successful in the
fall election that it controlled the state. In Minnesota, where a
Farmer-Labor Party already existed, Howard Y. Williams, FLPF
leader there, gained the support of the leader of the Minnesota party,
Governor Floyd Olson. On March 29, 1934, the Minnesota Convention
adopted unanimously a highly socialistic platform. Olson was reelected on the Farmer-Labor ticket. Naturally, the FLPF was encouraged by these gains in Wisconsin and Minnesota and obtained the
promise from both parties that they would join in a national thirdparty movement in the 1936 presidential race. Many events by the
spring of 1935, conspired to augment third-party implementation;
Donald R. McCoy observes:
The depressed payrolls in manufacturing industries remained fairly stable
from about April, 1934, to the fall of the following year. The prevailing trend of
wholesale prices for farm products in 1935 and the first quarter of 1936 was
downward. Between early 1933 and 1934, unemployment rolls had been reduced 16 percent, but from 1934 to 1935 the number of jobless persons decreased only by about 6 percent.5'

In addition, labor was disturbed by Congress's failure to act on its
behalf, and following the Supreme Court's decision that the National
Industrial Recovery Act was unconstitutional (May 27, 1935), a series
of strikes occurred. Many labor groups in their dissatisfaction began to
look to the FLPF. Successful third-party activities in California, Washington, and Oregon and the growing disenchantment with Roosevelt on
the part of congressional progressives heightened LIPA's optimism.
Rexford Tugwell, one of Roosevelt's braintrusters and colleague of
Dewey's, was increasingly dissatisfied with Roosevelt's appeasement.
If these dissident forces could be united, they could form an irresistible
front in 1936; but cooperation was difficult to attain, especially from
the socialists. Norman Thomas sought to strengthen his hand by
working for a united front with the Communists. This caused a split in
the Socialist Party. The Communists, on the other hand, tempered
their aggressive dogmatism by pledging to work with liberal radical
groups on a common front. This easing of relations between socialists,
liberals, and communists, however, proved to be fatal to LIPA efforts,
for the League officials were avowedly anticommunist.
51McCoy,72.

This content downloaded from 74.217.196.17 on Mon, 30 Jun 2014 16:56:40 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

82

EDWARD

J. BORDEAU

Nonetheless, the FLPF thought the time was ripe for the formation
of the long awaited third party; they feared delay might allow some
other independent group the opportunity to initiate the party in a way
to be divisive. The FLPF first looked to enlist the support of congressional progressives but this effort was no more successful than Dewey's
1930 attempt to engage Norris' support. The progressives were united
in their views on legislative policy but each was too much of a leader to
be a follower. Middle West leaders, Amlie and Williams, were able to
induce support from Farmer-Labor groups there; a conference was
called in Chicago, July 5, and 6, 1935. The response was excellent-all
radical groups attending, except for the communists. However, instead
of creating a new party, another organization-again so as to be most
inclusive in uniting contending groups-was formed: The American
Commonwealth Political Federation. The platform adopted was consistent with proposals urged by Midwestern groups since the 1890's.
Generally, most members were encouraged about the possibilities for
1936, although few thought the new party could gain control of the
presidency; but a powerful showing could be used to pressure the
administration in certain LIPA directions. Howard Y. Williams,
FLPF leader in Wisconsin, was confident that by 1940 the new party
could be in control and Dewey agreed.52
Despite these initially auspicious conditions, difficulties arose over
the feasibility of running a presidential candidate in 1936 under the
third-party banner. Some thought the candidates should be restricted
to state and congressional offices. It was feared that a poor showing in
the presidential race might ruin, for good, third-party possibilities in
the future. When the newly formed ACPF moved to have the Minnesota Farmer-Labor Party call for a third-party convention, Governor Olson was undecided about running a presidential nominee, for he
feared a failure in 1936 would cripple third-party efforts for subsequent
years. Olson was ambivalent at first, saying he would leave the decision
up to the convention-then he reneged. It seems he had been making
deals with Roosevelt behind the scenes and as the convention drew
nearer early in May, he publicly counseled his party to boycott the
convention if a presidential candidate were voted. He feared a thirdparty presidential candidate would aid Republicans by dividing liberals; this action proved so divisive as to knock the wind out of the sails
of the convention before it even met on May 30, in Chicago.
What had promised to be one of the most energetic and best organized third-party movements in American history was deflected by
factionalism. But there were other oppositional forces that played a
part in dividing third-party efforts before they could congeal. The
agrarian leader, Milo Reno-an avid third party promoter-died
early in May; again as with Olson, some feared a third party might
52Ibid.,93.
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aid reactionary forces, so they went over to Roosevelt. Another
significant disadvantage was the infiltration into the ACPF of communists; indeed this organization had become dominated by them and
at the convention they had free rein. Knowing this, several FLPF
and LIPA leaders refused to attend at the last moment. Consequently,
no third party was formed. This failure of the ACPF in 1936 effectively
killed the LIPA. Its leaders for the most part, like Thomas Amlie,
Howard Y. Williams, and Paul Douglas, swung over to Roosevelt, as
did Oswald Garrison Villard, the editor of The Nation, and Alfred
Bingham, the editor of Common Sense, the official organ of LIPA.53
And John Dewey? He expressed his disappointment:
I intend to vote for Norman Thomas for President.It was a disappointment that no genuine mass third party was organized,especiallyin view of
the fact that the so-called Union Party is a union of inflationistsand semifascist elements. I realize that fear of reactionaryRepublicanismwill lead
manyto vote for Rooseveltwho have no faith in the DemocraticParty;but I
do not believe that the actual difference between the policies of the old
parties will be great, whoever is elected. I think the RepublicanParty is
conductinga campaignunderfalse pretense.54
In evaluating LIPA activities, one could claim that the movement
was a failure in terms of its immediate objectives; yet, even here the
LIPA had sponsored and helped to elect many third-party candidates
as congressmen, governors, and senators. Thus, the seeds of a new
political philosophy were planted in governmental offices. As an educational institution, its primary office, the LIPA played a vital role in
informing the public of the realities of the economic collapse, thus preparing the way, ideologically, for the acceptance of the new role of the
government. Indeed the New Deal did not go far enough in remedying
the underlying causes of economic inequality and instability, but there
can be little doubt that it paved the way for further governmental
inroads into banking, business, and industry, and the educational work
performed by the LIPA gave support to even that limited governmental control.
While the New Deal was not, to Dewey's mind, radical enough in
terms of his socialism, it was nonetheless greatly under the influence
of his instrumentalism and pragmatism even if this pragmatism was
more ad hoc and headless than his own. Among the Roosevelt Brain
Trusters were Dewey's Columbia colleagues, A. A. Berle, Jr. and
Rexford Tugwell, who "applied their interpretation of Dewey's experimental method to the problems of New Deal recovery and
reform."55 Rexford Tugwell, in 1920, had become an instructor at
531bid.,108-13.
54"HowThey Are Voting: II," New Republic, 88 (Oct. 9, 1936), 249.
55Sidney Ratner, "Pragmatism in America," Essays in American Historiography,
ed. Donald Sheehan and Harold C. Syrett (New York, 1960), 210.
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Columbia and was greatly influenced by "faculty members, especially
John Dewey."56 Tugwell acknowledged Dewey's influence, and even
if he had not done so explicitly, his pragmatic approach to social and
economic problems, his wedding of the social sciences and philosophy
in dealing "with the insistent problems of industrialism," and his belief
in the application of science and technology and experimentation to
social planning, would have been sufficient to demonstrate his indebtedness.57
Dewey could not accept Roosevelt's compromise with capitalism
for he saw clearly that the New Deal permitted power and rule to
remain essentially in the same hands as those that had brought the
country to its present state-dominated as those hands are by the
profit motive. Michael Harrington in his most recent work has shown
that the Roosevelt compromise lies at the bottom of many of our
present economic and social problems.58
Dewey's activities, his solutions and commitments during the
Depression, force us to seriously question Morton White's charge
that Dewey's genre of liberalism "supplies us with no particular or
specific political position that can be acted on, only a plea for intelligence."59 Dewey's experimental approach to political, social, and
economic problems does not require adherence to dogmas-to some
this seems a disadvantage. But attention to specific conditions leads
to specific and workable solutions, calculated to reconstruct a problematic situation. His vision was neither narrow nor ad hoc. He committed his liberal following to a socialistic program of reform, yet
remaining within the American democratic tradition; he saw clearly
the need to put the major industries into the hands of the people so as
to serve the public sector and not merely the private. To achieve the
democratization of industry, he sought to use power, political organization, and pressure-not the violent overthrow of the government.
Taxation instead of confiscation was to be employed to secure the
socialization of banks, railroads, oil, and power. Indeed one might
criticize Dewey's proposals-their feasibility-but it seems well beside
the point to write that his political liberalism "commits us to no
specific course of action."60
Sacred Heart University.
"6BernardSternsher, Rexford Tugwell and the New Deal (New Brunswick, 1964), 6.
57Ibid., 15.
8sToward a Democratic Left, A Radical Program for a New Majority (New York,

1968),passim.
59SocialThought in America, The Revolt Against Formalism (Boston, 1957), 201.
60Ibid.
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